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  While many concerns have been expressed over the impact of increasing globalization, 
many of them centre on the possibility of a race to the bottom in which governments seek to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by removing policies that, although potentially socially 
desirable, are viewed as unattractive to firms. This worry has been expressed in the arenas of 
taxation, environmental regulation, and labour standards, among others. While there is a growing 
literature estimating the extent of the race to the bottom in international taxation and 
environmental policies, to our knowledge to date there is no evidence on the potential race to the 
bottom in labour standards. This is the gap the current paper fills. Using panel data on 148 
developing countries from 1985 to 2002, we utilize spatial econometric methods to estimate 
whether the Mosley (2011) and Mosley and Uno (2007) measure of labour rights in one country 
depends on those elsewhere. For the full sample, we find a significant and positive spatial lag, 
which is consistent with strategic complements and a necessary condition for there to be a race to 
the bottom. In particular, this seems to be driven primarily by competition in labour practices 
rather than labour laws, suggesting that competition is driven less by a failure to institute 
regulations but by an unwillingness to enforce them. Since there is a noticeable downward trend 
in both of these measures over the sample period, we take this as evidence of a race to the 
bottom.  
  Although there has been less attention paid to the potential for a race to the bottom in 
labour standards as compared to one in taxes or environmental policies, the essence of the 
argument is the same. Labour standards such as the right of collective bargaining result in higher 
labour costs. All else equal, mobile investment would prefer a location with weaker standards 
and lower costs. Evidence of FDI being deterred by labour standards is provided by Görg (2002), 3 
 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005), and Dewit, et al. (2009). It should be noted, however, that there 
is disagreement on this issue, with Kucera (2002) and Rodrik (1996) providing dissenting 
opinions.
1 The issue of how FDI depends on standards, however, is a very different question 
from the one we ask, which is whether labour standards in one location depend on those in 
another.
2 In particular, even if FDI does not flow in as a result of a country’s reduction in labour 
standards, if politicians believe that it does then this alone could result in the race to the bottom.  
Although to our knowledge no one has attempted to estimate the extent of the race to the 
bottom in labour standards before, spatial econometrics have been used to look for a race to the 
bottom in taxes and in environmental standards. The first group of work includes Devereux, 
Lockwood, and Redoano (2008), Davies and Voget (2008), Overesche and Rinke (2009) and 
others. Generally, this work has focused on tax competition between developed countries where 
there is some evidence of a positive spatial lag, meaning that as tax rates fall in one nation, this 
lowers tax rates elsewhere. An exception to this is Klemm and van Parys (2009) who focus on 
Latin America and Africa, finding that they compete in tax holidays. In the environmental 
literature, the focus has been on two issues: the joint adoption of environmental agreements 
(including the work of Beron et al. (2003), Murdoch et al. (2003) and Davies and Naughton 
(2006)) and interaction in environmental policies (which includes Fredriksson and Millimet 
(2002), Levinson (2003) and Fredriksson et al. (2004)). These studies tend to find evidence 
consistent with the race to the bottom. However, due to data limitations, many of them either 
restrict their attention to developed countries or to competition across US states. Davies and 
                                                 
1 One possible reason they provide is that operating in a high standards location provides consumers a guarantee on 
how a firm treats its workers. As such, they may be willing to pay more for the firm’s product on humanitarian 
grounds. See Greenhill, et. al (2009) for a full discussion. In addition, there is evidence that increased FDI may 
improve labour standards (Mosley, 2011; Davies and Voy, 2009; Neumayer and de Soysa, 2005). 
2 Greenhill, et. al (2009) do test to see whether the “practice content of trade” is a predictor for a given nation’s 
labour standards. However, although they do control for the potential endogeneity of trade volumes, they do not deal 
with potential endogeneity in standards that would result from competition. 4 
 
Naughton (2006) are an exception to this, who find that developed countries affect the treaty 
participation of both developed and developing nations whereas the developing nations only tend 
to impact themselves. 
For our full sample using GDP weights (which assume that a given nation pays more 
attention to the standards in larger economies), our estimates find that a standard deviation 
decline in labour standard elsewhere leads a given country to lower its own standards by 3.8%. 
Although this magnitude varies somewhat when weighting by per-capita GDP or trade openness, 
the qualitative result is the same. When we decompose our measure of labour standards into its 
components – the laws guaranteeing labour rights (laws) and the enforcement of those laws 
(practices) – we find evidence primarily for labour practices. This holds for both significance and 
magnitude of the estimated impact. This suggests that while countries may well attempt to “put 
on a good face” by instituting labour-friendly laws for reasons similar to those discussed by 
Kucera (2002), they may then be competing for FDI by simply turning a blind eye towards 
violations of those laws (or are simply unable to adequately enforce them). This finding is also 
notable because both laws and practices have similar trends, indicating our finding for practices 
is causal rather than the result of an uncontrolled for time trend. We also estimate our model for 
subsamples of the data. These estimates reveal that the competition is primarily driven by 
countries with weak standards, occurs both in relatively poor and relatively rich countries, and is 
strongest for Latin America and the Middle East. Again, these differences stand out against a 
similar downward trend in standards for each group and region, suggesting that we are capturing 
evidence of interdependence in standards instead of a mere trend. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes both our data and our methodology. 
Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes. 5 
 
2. Empirical Methodology and Data 
  In this section, we describe both our data, which is a panel data set across 148 countries 
from 1985 to 2002, and our estimation specification.  
2.1 Estimation Specification 
Our  baseline  specification  estimates  the  labour  standards  in  country  i  in  year  t  as  a 
function a set of exogenous variables  , i t X  (which includes a lagged dependent variable):  
  , , , i t i i t i t LR X β β ε = + +   (1) 
where  i β  is the country-specific constant and  , i t ε  is the error term. Our control variables are 
drawn from the existing literature and are described below. To this baseline, we then introduce 
the labour rights in other countries in year t, a variable known in the literature as the spatial lag. 
Specifically, we estimate: 
  , , , , , , i t i j i t i t i t i t
j i
LR LR X β ρ ω β ε
≠
= + + + ∑   (2) 
where  , , , j i t i t
j i
LR ω
≠ ∑ is the spatial lag, i.e. the weighted average of labour standards in the other 














. In words, the share that country i gives 
to country j is equivalent to j’s share of the total GDP across countries not including country i.
3 
Our rationale for using GDP as the weight is two-fold. First, one might anticipate that country i 
pays more attention to what is taking place in larger countries rather than small ones. Second, 
when the goal of manipulating labour standards is to attract FDI, this will depend on the 
elasticity of FDI to a given country’s policies. With this in mind, if country j is already attractive 
to FDI relative to country k, then a change in j’s labour standards has a larger impact on the 
                                                 
3 As described by Anselin (1988), it is common to “row standardize” the weights so that the sum of the weights adds 
up to one. 6 
 
allocation of FDI than a comparable change in k. This in turn would make i more responsive to 
j’s labour standards than to k’s, a difference that (2) reflects by giving a greater weight to j.
4 
Since, as confirmed in many studies and reviewed by Blonigen (2005), FDI is attracted to larger 
countries, this would imply a greater sensitivity on the part of country i to the labour standards of 
a large country. GDP has been used as a weight in several papers estimating the race to the 
bottom in taxation (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008, for example). In addition, we 




























 where Opennessj,t is the sum of exports plus imports relative to GDP (a 
common proxy for the inverse of trade costs in the empirical FDI literature). For both of these, 
our rationale is comparable to the choice of GDP since FDI is often attracted to wealthier and 
more open countries. Nevertheless, since high per-capita GDP can be correlated with wage costs 
thus deterring vertical FDI (in which MNE output is intended for export out of the host) and 
greater openness reduces the need for horizontal FDI (in which FDI is intended to replace 
exports to the host), the net impact of these factors is less clear-cut than GDP. Indeed, as 
discussed by Blonigen (2005), the literature finds mixed results for these variables. We therefore 
rely on the GDP weights for our primary results and use these alternatives as robustness checks. 
  The difficulty with the spatial lag is that if labour standards in i depend on those in j and 
vice versa, the spatial lag is endogenous. We deal with this and the lagged dependent variable by 
using the Blundell and Bond (1998) SYS-GMM estimator accounting for the Windmeijer (2005) 
                                                 
4 Baldwin and Krugman (2004) provide a model of precisely this issue for tax competition in which a large country, 
by virtue of its attractive domestic market, has a greater impact on FDI flows than a small country does.  7 
 
correction.
5 In addition to using lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments, we 
also follow standard spatial econometric procedure and use  , , , j i t j t
j i
X ω
≠ ∑  ,that is, the weighted 
average of the other nations’ exogenous variables (not including the weighted average of their 
lagged dependent variable). The intuition behind doing so is that for a given country j, its 
exogenous variables directly impact its labour standards but are not dependent on those in i.  
Therefore they are correlated with the endogenous variable but are themselves exogenous, 
making them suitable instruments. Within the literature on this estimator, there is concern 
regarding the potential inclusion of too many instruments (Roodman 2009a, 2009b). Therefore, 
in the reported results, we restrict the lag structure to t-3 and t-5. The reason for using these years 
is that, when including t-2 lags, our instruments failed to pass the exogeneity tests. Nevertheless, 
we experimented with a number of alternative sets of instruments (such as excluding some or all 
of the weighted average of the other nations’ exogenous variables) and found qualitatively 
similar results in all cases.
6 
  This baseline specification is modified to explore the robustness of our findings. The 
specifics of these modifications are described below. 
2.2 Data 
  We use annual data for 148 countries from 1985 to 2002. The list of countries is in the 
appendix. For our dependent variable, we use Mosley (2011) and Mosley and Uno’s (2007) all-
inclusive Labour Rights index constructed annually from 1985 to 2002 for 148 countries. This 
composite index, capturing “basic collective labour rights”, follows the template of Kucera 
                                                 
5 In unreported results, we also utilized IV GMM estimation rather than one which deals with lags. The primary 
difference is that when doing so, we typically found a significantly positive spatial lag when using GDP weights. 
Thus, on the whole, our results are robust to alternative methods of controlling for endogeneity. These alternative 
results are available on request. 
6 These alternate results are available on request. 8 
 
(2002), which covers 37 types of violations of labour rights under six different categories.
7 These 
six categories are (a) freedom of association and collective bargaining-related liberties, (b) the 
right to establish and join worker and union organizations, (c) other union activities, (d) the right 
to bargain collectively, (e) the right to strike, and (f) rights in export processing zones.
8 It is 
noteworthy however that the Mosley index does not capture aspects of labour standards such as 
minimum wages, and individual labour rights like employment benefits and working conditions.  
In each of these above mentioned six categories, violations of labour rights by the 
government or employers (be they local or foreign firms) are identified as an absence of legal 
rights, limitations on legal rights and/or a violation of those legal rights. The index then accounts 
for both the de jure (laws) labour standards and the de facto (practices) standards prevailing in a 
country. The law component of the index, which covers 21 of the 37 categories in the index, 
captures whether or not the required laws to safeguard the collective rights of workers, for 
example whether an industry is allowed to impose limits on workers’ right to strike or bargain 
collectively, are in place. The practices component, meanwhile, captures the actual number of 
violations observed in the labour rights prescribed in the laws. Thus, the practices component 
captures whether there are any registered acts of violations of the laws governing labour 
standards.  
To construct the index, Mosley and Uno (2007) drew upon information from the US State 
Department's annual country reports on human rights practices, reports from both the Committee 
                                                 
7 As such, it is an improvement over other measures of labor rights or standards which capture only a single factor, 
such  the number  of  ILO  conventions  (Botero  et  al.,  2000), rate  of  worker injuries  (Bonnal,  2008)  or a  single 
subjective index (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999). 
8 These categories are line with those laid out by the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
adopted by ILO member states in June 1998.This declaration identified the core or fundamental labor rights as 
including the freedom of association (right to unionize), effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining 
(right to bargain and protest), elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, effective abolition of child 
labor, elimination of discrimination with respect to employment and occupation and respect to minimum wages and 
hours of work. 9 
 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) and the 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), and the annual surveys on violations of trade 
union rights which published by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
9 
If the information from all three sources displays violation of labour rights over the year, Mosley 
and Uno (2007) assigned a score of 1 for each of the 37 indicators for a country. If this is not the 
case a score of 0 is assigned.
10 Then, using the recommendation of two experts and following 
Kucera’s (2002) methodology, weights were assigned to each of the indicators and the index was 
constructed. This resulted in a labour rights index which was coded on a scale of 0 – 28.5 and a 
labour practices rights index ranging from 0 – 27.5 wherein highest value represents upholding 
respect for labour laws/practices. The sum of these category scores is then the annual measure of 
labour rights violations, which, in our sample of developing countries has a mean of 25.7 and a 
maximum of 37. Contrasting this with developed countries, where scores reach 76.5, illustrates 
the relatively weak protections developing country workers are provided. Overall, the Mosley 
and Uno (2007) comprehensive measure is a huge improvement on previous indices, such as 
those used by Cingranelli and Richards (2006) and Bohning (2005), because of the multiple 
sources of information, sophisticated weighting methodology and reliability of the information. 
Having both the overall index and its two components provides us with two advantages. 
First, it permits us to examine whether there is any evidence of a race to the bottom in one 
component or the other, that is, whether governments appear to be competing by altering legal 
                                                 
9 The US report exclusively covers violations on labor rights in each country related to freedom of association, right 
to bargain collectively and strike, and export processing zones. The CEACR and CFA reports, both of which are 
associated with the ILO, are based on the information provided by the respective governments on complaints filed 
by unions, workers’ organizations and other employee associations. The ILO mandates that these are submitted 
annually and that they include progress reports how grievances are being addressed. These reports are then reviewed 
by two independent experts to deal with potential misrepresentation. The ICFTU, rechristened the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in 2006, surveys provide information on legal barriers to unions, violations of 
rights, murders, disappearances and detention of members associated with labor unions.  
10 If violation of labor rights in respective indicators is recorded more than once, in either one source or in multiple 
sources, the maximum value according to Mosley and Uno (2007) remains 1.  10 
 
frameworks or simply by turning a blind eye towards violations. This latter is of particular 
concern since a nation may bow to international pressure and introduce legal labour rights but 
then simply fail to enforce them. Alternatively, strong laws may be undermined by weak 
enforcement, resulting in a low practices score. As shown in Table 1, the correlation between the 
two measures is .20, suggesting that this is indeed a possibility. Second, although a positive 
spatial lag is suggestive of a race to the bottom, it could also signify a race to the top. In 
particular, one might expect that workers in one country might observe superior labour standards 
in other countries and demand similar treatment (and thus introducing the possibility of yardstick 
competition rather than competition for mobile firms).
11 In this case, one might expect an 
improvement in laws over time even as violations rise as more demanding workers file more 
registered complaints against their employers. This idea of diffusion through ‘public awareness’ 
and the spread of ‘norms and ideas’ is explored by Neumayer and de Soysa (2006), Baghwati 
(2004) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). As shown in Figure 1, however, we find that both 
laws and practices have worsened over time, suggesting both an erosion of legal protections and 
increased violations of those weakened standards although it is indeed practices that have fallen 
fastest. In Figure 2, where we report sample averages weighting by GDP (as is done in the spatial 
lag), these declines are even more pronounced.
12  
In choosing our vector of control variables (Xi,t), we follow the work of Caraway (2009), 
Greenhill et al. (2009), Mosley and Uno (2007), Neumayer and de Soysa (2005, 2006, 2007), 
Busse (2004), Arestoff and Granger (2004), Brown (2001) and others. Among the standard 
                                                 
11 Within the taxation literature, Salmon (1987) was the first to develop a theory of “yardstick competition” in which 
the tax authority in one jurisdiction depends on that elsewhere not because officials use taxes to attract mobile 
factors, but because voters in their jurisdiction judge the performance of the authority by comparing the local tax 
rate  to those  elsewhere.  Bordignon,  Cerniglia, and  Revelli  (2003) and  Allers and  Elhorst  (2005)  utilize  spatial 
econometrics to find positive spatial lags which they interpret as evidence of yardstick competition. 
12 These diffusion of norm effects are found to be much stronger in bilateral trade (see the ‘California effect’ in 
Greenhill et al. 2009). 11 
 
controls in the literature are measures of economic development. With this in mind, we include 
logged per capita GDP (measured in constant 2000 US dollars) and its growth rate (ERS 2010).
13 
We also include Opennessi,t to control for a country’s exposure to world markets. Following 
Neumayer and de Soysa (2006), we also include the manufacturing value added share in GDP, 
which is included since labour rights in manufacturing are likely better reported than those in 
agriculture. We also follow their lead and include the total labour force participation rate which 
is intended to capture the idea that higher the participation would mean greater demand for 
protective labour rights. Following Boockman (2006) and others, we include two political 
variables. The first is Democracyi,t, which is the average score from Freedom House’s civil and 
political liberties ranking and ranges 0 (full liberties) to -7 (severely limited liberties).
14 We also 
include a variable from Beck et al. (2001) that captures the ideology of the incumbent 
government. We recode this measure so that it ranges between -1 and 1, with higher numbers 
indicating a more leftist (and therefore potentially pro-labour) government.  
  Additionally, we account for the ratification of key ILO conventions to measure whether 
these agreements have had any measurable impact. Rodrik (1996), Busse (2002) and Neumayer 
and de Soysa (2006) fail to find any impact of these agreements on labour rights in developing 
countries. We follow Neumayer and de Soysa (2006) to include two dummy variables one equal 
to one when a nation has ratified ILO convention number 87, which deals with freedom of 
association, and a second equal to one if a country has ratified convention number 98 which 
secures the right to collective bargaining. The variable is constructed using the information from 
ILO’s Database of International Labour Standards (www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/). In addition, we 
                                                 
13 We also use constant 2000 US dollars in constructing our weights. 
14  The  Polity  IV  measure  could not  be  considered  because  our  sample includes  many  small  countries  such  as 
Barbados,  Antigua  and  Barbuda,  for  which  the  Polity  IV  index  is  absent.  In  order  to  avoid  losing  too  many 
observations, we opt for the Freedom House score. Alternatively, when using the Polity IV index we could not find 
any significant changes in our main results.  12 
 
also include a dummy variable capturing whether a country has signed a Structural Adjustment 
Facility program with the IMF or otherwise, obtained from Dreher (2006) and Boockmann and 
Dreher (2003). For details on summary statistics, the measurement of our data, or their sources, 
please see the appendix. 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Baseline Results 
  Table 2 presents our baseline results. Column 1 shows results not including the spatial lag 
or the lagged dependent variable to ease the comparison between our results and those of others 
studying the determinants of labour rights. As expected, we find that countries with faster 
growing GDPs, less open economies, better democracies and that have ratified the ILO  
conventions tend to have better labour rights. Of additional note is the significant downward 
trend in labour rights over time. After controlling for country-specific fixed effects, however, our 
other controls are insignificant. Column 2 modifies this by including the one year lag of labour 
rights (and thus moving from fixed effects to SYS-GMM estimation). In addition, as discussed 
by Beck and Katz (1995), it aids in controlling for potential dynamic effects of the exogenous 
variables on the dependent variable. As can be seen, the coefficient on the lag is significantly 
positive and its confidence interval ends well before one rejecting a unit root. Column 2 then 
forms our preferred specification. 
  Columns 3 through 5 add to Column 2 by including the spatial lag term using GDP, per-
capita GDP, and Openness weights respectively. With regards to the controls, this results in more 
significance, with smaller, industrialized, left-leaning countries having significantly better rights. 
Turning to the coefficient of interest, in each case, we find a positive and significant spatial lag. 
To interpret the coefficient on the spatial lag for the GDP weights, this implies that if all other 13 
 
countries lower their labour rights by one point, the country in question would lower its labour 
rights by .41 points.
15 Alternatively, a standard deviation reduction in the spatial lag (a reduction 
of 2.4) would then reduce those in the country in question by .984, a 3.8% decline at the sample 
mean. This lies in between the estimated impact when per-capita GDP weights are used (a 6.1% 
decline) and when Openness weights are used (a drop of 2.5%).
16 Another way to interpret the 
coefficient on the spatial lag is to calculate the change in country i’s labour rights from a change 
in another country j’s labour rights, which is equal to  , , j i t ω ρ . This is then the slope of the i’s best 
response and is a measure of the degree of labour standards competition between countries. 
Since the spatial lag is positive, this can be interpreted as evidence of strategic complementarity. 
While strategic complements can theoretically result in a race to the bottom or the top, since the 
trend in labour rights is downward, we interpret our results as evidence of an economically 
meaningful race to the bottom in labour rights.  
To interpret the coefficients for the other variables, it is important to recognize that there 
is both a direct effect (i.e. the estimated coefficient) and an indirect effect arising from how a 
change in an exogenous variable for country i affects i’s labour rights, which in turn affects those 
elsewhere which feeds back into i’s labour rights via the spatial lag. Rewriting (1) in its matrix 
form: 
  Y A WY X ρ β ε = + + +   (3) 
where A is a vector of country specific intercepts and W is the weighting matrix with  , , j i t ω  in the 
i,jth element and zeros elsewhere (i.e. so that the country rights for country i in year t do not 
                                                 
15 Note that in this and in the Openness weighting scheme, we find spatial lags that are statistically significantly less 
than 1. This is yet another reason to prefer the GDP weighting scheme over the per-capita GDP one since the game 
theoretic interpretation of a coefficient greater than one would be that of an unstable Nash equilibrium. 
16 Note that these difference result from not only different coefficients but also different standard deviations in the 
spatial lag (1.62 for the per-capita weights and 1.82 for the openness weights). 14 
 
predict itself and that values for years other than t are given zero weights in predicting the labour 
rights in t), define M I W ρ = − . Then (3) can be rewritten as: 
 
1 1 Y M A M X β ε
− − = + +   (4) 
implying that the total marginal effect of an exogenous variable is  ( )
1 I W ρ β
− − .
17 Since the 
impact of the controls is not our primary focus and our weights vary by year, we do not delve 
further into these in the interest of space. It is notable, however, that adoption of the ILO 
conventions does little to impact labour rights, something we return to below. Finally, with 
respect to our instruments, we use Hansen’s J-test (Hansen, 1982) which shows that the null-
hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the conventional level of significance.
18 
  In Table 3, we repeat the specification for Table 2 columns 3 through 5 but use the two 
sub-indices of labour rights: labour practices (columns 1-3) and labour laws (columns 4-6). For 
the control variables, as with the combined index, smaller, democratic, and left-leaning states 
have higher labour practices and labour laws. In addition, wealthier, less open, and more 
industrialized countries have better labour practices although this has no impact on labour laws. 
Finally, unlike the combined index where the ILO treaties had no significant effect, they now 
raise labour laws but lower labour practices. This latter result would be consistent with these 
agreements leading countries to pass more laws protecting workers but turning an increasingly 
blind eye to violations of those laws. 
  Turning to the spatial lag, for labour practices, we find results that are comparable to 
those for the combined index results with a standard deviation decline in all other nations’ labour 
                                                 
17 Note the importance of having ρ<1 for the calculation of this effect. 
18 As discussed by Roodman (2009a, 2009b), the Blundell-Bond estimator can fall prey to an overabundance of 
instruments, inflating the J-test results. As noted above, in alternate specifications, we explored alternative sets of 
instruments.  In these  unreported results,  we  found  comparable  results  for  the  spatial  lags.  When  including t-2 
instruments for the GMM-style variables, we were not always able to reject endogeneity. In addition, when using 
some of the subsamples, we were forced to drastically reduce the number of instruments in order to achieve J-test 
values less than 1. However, since we still found results comparable to those reported here, we opted to maintain a 
consistent set of instruments across the regressions in order to simplify the presentation and avoid confusion.  15 
 
practices leading to a decline in those of the country in question of 3% (using GDP weights), 
5.6% (per-capita GDP weights), and 2.6% (Openness weights). For labour laws, however, we 
only find significance for the per-capita GDP and Openness weighting schemes. Thus the results 
are somewhat less robust for labour laws. This would be reasonable if nations find it more 
difficult to compete for FDI in laws (since doing so may draw international criticism) than in 
how they choose to apply the laws they have on the books. This also mirrors the differences 
across the two measures regarding the ILO labour rights conventions. For those two schemes 
resulting in a significant lag for laws, the predicted percentage changes in labour laws from a 
standard deviation decline in the spatial lag are 2.3% (per capita GDP weights) and 2.2% 
(Openness weights), again suggesting that the responsiveness of labour laws in a given country 
to those elsewhere is less than the responsiveness in their application of those laws. 
  In Table 4, we restrict our attention to the non-OECD countries out of the concern that 
the results may be driven by the OECD members, i.e. relatively advanced countries with strong 
labour standards. Since, as argued by Mosley and Uno (2007), these countries are perhaps less 
likely to compete for FDI using labour standards as opposed to other means, if they are behind 
our significant spatial lag then this would call into question the interpretation of our results. Note 
that in this (as well as in all subsamples below), when we create a subsample we recalculate the 
spatial lag and the traditional IV-style instruments using only those nations in the subsample, i.e. 
assigning those outside of the subsample zero weight. This then assumes that the non-OECD 
subsample does not respond to OECD member labour rights. As can be seen, our results for this 
non-OECD only subsample are comparable to those for the main sample, indicating that our 
results are not being driven by the relatively advanced nations. Also, although from this point 
forward we only report the results for our preferred GDP weights for parsimony. When using the 16 
 
alternative weighting schemes, we found results comparable to the GDP weights with the 
exception that as above we often obtained significantly positive spatial lags when using the 
labour laws index as our dependent variable.
19 
3.2 Results for different country categories 
  The above results provide evidence consistent with a race to the bottom both in the 
overall labour rights index, labour practices, and, to a lesser extent, in labour laws.  In Table 5, we 
explore this further by separating our countries into two categories: those for which the mean 
labour rights index over the sample period was below the median and those for which their mean 
index was above the median. We do this to investigate whether it is the case that the extent of 
competition differs between developing nations with relatively weak standards and those with 
relatively strong standards. Note that as in the non-OECD sample, we recalculate the spatial lags 
using only within group countries, implying that below the median countries do not respond to 
those above the median and vice versa. As can be seen, we find much stronger evidence of 
competition among countries with relatively low standards where the coefficients somewhat 
greater than those in the full sample. This, combined with the lower average level of standards 
means that a one standard deviation decline in the spatial lag would lower the combined index by 
5.1% and practices by 4.3% with no significant effect for laws. In contrast, we only find a 
significant coefficient on labour practices for the high standard group with its coefficient being 
much smaller than its counterpart for the low standard group, which when combined with the 
greater average level of practices, results in an estimated 0.8% decline in a given country’s 
standards when the spatial lag falls by a standard deviation. It is also worth noting that if our 
results were simply capturing an overall trend in labour standards, one would expect similar 
results for the above and below median groups because their trends are comparable. The fact that 
                                                 
19 These results are available on request. 17 
 
we find distinct results suggests that we are capturing something other than a mere trend in the 
dependent variable. 
  Table 6 repeats the estimates of Table 5 but also includes the other group’s spatial lag, 
i.e. it allows for countries below the median to respond to those above and vice versa.
20 For those 
below the median, we find a picture similar to that before with respect to within group 
competition, but no evidence for competition across groups. For those with relatively high 
standards, we do find some evidence suggesting that the above median countries respond to 
those below the median. The estimated effect of a one standard deviation decline in the spatial 
lag for below median countries is -1.7% for both above median labour rights and practices. Thus, 
to the extent that high standard countries do compete with low standard countries, the extent of 
this competition appears to be less severe than that between low standard nations. Again, 
however, there is little evidence of competition among the strong standards countries. 
  Tables 7 and 8 again split our sample into two groups but delineate countries according to 
whether their sample average per-capita income was above or below the median.
21 Note that 
since per-capita GDP is generally insignificantly correlated with labour standards (something 
that holds true even in a univariate regression), that this is a different classification of countries 
from that above. Table 7 corresponds to Table 5 in that it assumes no cross-group interactions. 
For the relatively poor countries, we only find a significant spatial lag for labour practices where 
a one standard deviation decline in the spatial lag results in a 2.5% decline in practices. We find 
more significance in the wealthier group of countries, where the estimated impacts of a standard 
                                                 
20 Ideally, we would choose to estimate the above and below median specifications simultaneously. However, to our 
knowledge, such an estimator does not exist. 
21 In unreported results, we classified countries into three categories corresponding  to a country’s 2002 World Bank 
classification into the lower income, lower middle income, and upper middle income categories. In these results, we 
found  strong  evidence  for  within  group  competition  by  the  middle  income  countries,  limited  evidence  of  such 
competition for the lower income countries, and no significant competition in the upper middle income countries. 
Further, we found no consistent evidence of cross-category competition.  18 
 
deviation decline in the spatial lag results in a 3.9% decline in labour standards and a 3.2% drop 
in practices.
 22 Table 8 modifies the estimation of 7 by introducing cross-group spatial lags. This 
addition does not affect the estimated pattern of within-group competition. Further, with one 
exception, we find no evidence of cross-group competition. 
  The above results suggest that competition is relatively fiercest between nations with 
already low standards (which may be those which have competed heavily along this dimension 
in the past) and those with above average incomes. Further, there is little evidence of cross-group 
competition, suggesting that these nations may be competing for different types of investment 
(for example, unskilled labour intensive FDI may primarily consider low income countries 
whereas skilled labour intensive FDI may only consider high income countries when deciding 
where to locate). Furthermore, the greatest evidence is for competition in practices rather than 
laws. This would be consistent with nations “putting on a good face” by instituting labour laws, 
but allowing firms to bypass those laws in practice. 
3.3 Results for different regions 
In addition to splitting our sample along the above characteristics, we do so across 
regions. There are two primary reasons for doing so. First, one might expect that countries within 
a region are much more likely to be competing with one another for FDI.
23 This is one reason 
Klemm and van Parys (2009) separate their sample when looking for evidence of tax competition 
in developing nations. Second, as discussed by Mosley and Uno (2007) and Neumayer and de 
Soysa (2006) there may be very religious and cultural differences across countries which 
                                                 
22 In unreported results, resource rich countries were removed from the high income country category. Nevertheless, 
a positive coefficient on the within group was found, indicating that the result is not driven by high per-capita 
income, low labor protection resource rich economies. 
23 This is why distance-driven weights are sometimes used in the empirical race to the bottom literature, e.g. Davies 
and Naughton (2006) 19 
 
influence the decision of what level of labour standards to enforce.
24  With this in mind, Table 9 
presents the estimated coefficient for the spatial lag using each of the dependent variables across 
five regions: Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East and 
Northern Africa. Note that these regressions include the full set of controls but that these are not 
reported for ease of presentation.
25 
In comparison to the full sample results, we generally find less significant results. Given 
the large drop in the number of observations, this is perhaps unsurprising. Nevertheless, we do 
find significant differences across regions. Latin America exhibits coefficients most in line with 
the full sample results, that is, a significantly positive spatial lag for the combined index and 
practices. The Middle East and African nations also exhibit a positive spatial lag, although only 
for practices. Neither Europe nor Sub-Saharan Africa result in significant spatial lags. Perhaps 
most remarkable are the results for Asia where we find a significantly negative spatial lag 
regardless of the measure of labour standards used. However, in unreported results dropping 
China from the set of Asian countries, we no longer found a significant spatial lag for labour 
rights or labour laws. When India (the second largest GDP in this subsample) is also excluded, 
we did not obtain significant spatial lags for any of the measures of labour standards. This 
suggests that the inclusion of these two large outliers are driving the unexpected negative 
coefficient. 
Finally, it is important to comment on our use of a time trend rather year-specific 
constants.  There are two reasons for doing this, both related to the fact that when including year-
specific effects, the variation the estimation utilizes is that relative to the within-year average. 
                                                 
24 Also, see Cho (2010) for these arguments with respect to the women’s labor rights. 
25 The full set of estimates are available on request. Note that we do not estimate cross-group interactions for these 
region subsamples since to do so required us to include five spatial lags which, given the sample sizes, resulted in 
little of interpretive value.  20 
 
First, from a game theoretic perspective, one would expect that when countries are very similar, 
their Nash labour standards may be similar. In the extreme, if all countries are identical, theory 
can easily obtain the result that equilibrium policies are identical. When estimating such a 
relationship with year dummies, however, this will drive down the significance on the spatial lag 
because it varies little across countries within a year. As a result, even if competition is driving 
the data generation process, the estimation can obscure that fact. Second, one must keep in mind 
the construction of the spatial lag, which is the weighted average of other countries’ policies. 
Consider two countries with equal GDPs, i with a high labour rights index and j with a low 
index. By construction, the spatial lag for i will be less than that of j because the only difference 
in their lags is that i’s includes j’s index in the summation whereas j’s includes i’s (with the 
difference between the two being the difference in their index numbers multiplied by the 
common weight).  As a result, countries with strong policies will tend to have small spatial lags 
whereas countries with weak policies will tend to have large spatial lags simply by construction. 
When using year dummies where variation in the spatial lag is relative to the yearly average 
drives the coefficient, this creates a downward bias in the estimated coefficient since high index 
countries will have below average spatial lags within a given year. In fact, when we estimate our 
results in Tables 2 and 3 but use year dummies instead of the time trend, we find significantly 
negative coefficients on the spatial lag which were all significantly less than -1 (for the GDP 
weights these were -5.829, -8.231, and -4.944 for the combined index, practices, and laws 
respectively). Thus, because of the nature of the spatial lag variable, it is generally unwise to use 
year dummies (see Klemm and van Parys (2009) for more discussion on this issue). 
4. Conclusion 21 
 
  The goal of this paper was to present the first set of empirical results exploring the 
possibility of a race to the bottom in labour standards. Using the Mosley (2011) measure of 
labour rights as well as its components on labour practices and labour laws, we utilize a spatial 
econometrics approach to estimate the extent of interdependence of labour standards across 
countries. We find a robustly positive and significant spatial lag which is consistent with 
strategic complements in both practices and the combined labour rights index. Since these 
measures declined over time, we interpret this as competition for FDI as opposed to labour rights 
diffusion which would result in an improvement of laws, potentially as practices declined as 
more workers sought to assert their rights. Notably, this pattern is less evident in labour laws, 
suggesting that competition is less in the institution of standards, but in their enforcement. This 
does not imply that such competition is universal, however. We find that it is concentrated in the 
countries with relatively weak standards and that it is focused in particular parts of the world, 
notably the Middle East and Latin America. 
  These results suggest several potential policy considerations. First, we often find that 
international labour agreements, particularly those championed by the ILO, tend to raise labour 
laws but not practices. This suggests that international coordination on these measures may need 
to follow up and ensure that laws which are adopted are then enforced. Second, the ability of a 
nation to attract FDI via this (or any other measure) is contingent on the other factors that attract 
investment such as domestic market size, institutional quality and the like. In particular, the 
evidence reviewed by Blonigen (2005) indicates that multinationals are attracted by lower trade 
barriers. As such, if the developed world signs a free trade agreement with a low labour standard 
country, thereby increasing its trade openness, our estimates indicate that this would force others 
to respond by competing more fiercely in labour standards to avoid losing investment. This 22 
 
suggests that it may be important to be mindful of such implications, particularly in Latin 
America and the Middle East, when pursuing international agreements or other policies that 
might affect the distribution of FDI. 23 
 
 
Figure 1: Labour Standards, Practices and Laws over Time 
 
 
Figure 2: GDP-Weighted Labour Standards, Practices and Laws over Time 24 
 
Table 1: Bivariate Correlations across Measures of Labour Standards 






Labour Rights Index  1.0000 
Labour Rights Laws  0.8277  1.0000 
Labour Rights Practices  0.7197  0.20600  1.0000 25 
 
Table 2: Baseline Results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
Weighting 
Scheme 
    GDP  Per-Capita 
GDP 
Openness 
Spatial Lag      0.410***  0.972***  0.359*** 
      (0.103)  (0.164)  (0.117) 
Lagged Dep. 
Var. 
  0.723***  0.748***  0.754***  0.749*** 
    (0.023)  (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.042) 
Per capita GDP 
(log) 
-0.834  -0.205  -0.032  -0.009  -0.036 
  (0.655)  (0.927)  (0.116)  (0.111)  (0.113) 
GDP (log)  0.200  -0.079  -0.607***  -0.605***  -0.591*** 
  (0.805)  (0.918)  (0.096)  (0.100)  (0.102) 
GDP growth 
rate 
0.007***  0.005**  -0.002  -0.000  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Openness  -0.010***  -0.007**  -0.005**  -0.005**  -0.004* 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Industry Share 
in GDP 
-0.017  0.012  0.031***  0.030***  0.029*** 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Labour Force 
Participation  
-0.024  -0.004  0.001  0.002  0.002 
  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Democracy   1.128***  0.666***  0.480***  0.472***  0.485*** 
  (0.129)  (0.115)  (0.103)  (0.099)  (0.102) 
Government 
Ideology 
0.287  0.243  0.473***  0.511***  0.504*** 
  (0.186)  (0.185)  (0.181)  (0.171)  (0.182) 
IMF SAF 
participation 
0.254  0.323  0.295  0.163  0.186 
  (0.286)  (0.267)  (0.347)  (0.341)  (0.352) 
ILO 87 and 98 
Treaties 
0.807***  0.338  0.005  0.033  0.007 
  (0.280)  (0.246)  (0.143)  (0.139)  (0.142) 
Trend  -0.467***  -0.293***  0.096**  0.218***  0.040 
  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.046)  (0.052)  (0.042) 
Constant  971.862***  209.160***  -186.272**  -447.759***  -77.199 
  (57.707)  (49.148)  (94.200)  (108.339)  (86.463) 
Observations  2458  2334  2334  2334  2334 
R-squared  0.701         
Hansen J-stat.  
(p-value) 
  .145  .574  .380  .178 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 




Table 3: Practices and Laws 
  (1)  (2) 
  Practices  Laws 
Weighting 
Scheme 
GDP  Per-Capita 
GDP 
Openness  GDP  Per-Capita 
GDP 
Openness 
Spatial Lag  0.374***  1.096***  0.473***  0.129  0.928***  0.688*** 
  (0.069)  (0.148)  (0.118)  (0.106)  (0.198)  (0.175) 
Lagged Dep. 
Var. 
0.590***  0.648***  0.576***  0.803***  0.751***  0.700*** 
  (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.040)  (0.048)  (0.051) 
Per capita 
GDP (log) 
0.194**  0.180**  0.194**  -0.119  -0.131  -0.135 
  (0.089)  (0.078)  (0.090)  (0.081)  (0.100)  (0.115) 
GDP (log)  -0.510***  -0.463***  -0.511***  -0.196***  -0.246***  -0.301*** 
  (0.074)  (0.066)  (0.073)  (0.053)  (0.073)  (0.078) 
GDP growth 
rate 
-0.003  -0.001  -0.003  0.002  0.001  0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Openness  -0.003*  -0.004**  -0.002  -0.000  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Industry 
Share in GDP 
0.020**  0.019**  0.018**  0.011  0.011  0.012 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Labour Force 
Participation 
0.005  0.005  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Democracy   0.153**  0.143**  0.167**  0.295***  0.355***  0.411*** 
  (0.069)  (0.062)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.084)  (0.091) 
Government 
Ideology 
0.316**  0.288**  0.343**  0.263***  0.315***  0.345*** 
  (0.139)  (0.128)  (0.137)  (0.093)  (0.096)  (0.103) 
IMF SAF 
participation 
0.050  -0.018  -0.004  0.216  0.186  0.204 
  (0.247)  (0.253)  (0.244)  (0.227)  (0.215)  (0.215) 
ILO 87 and 
98 Treaties 
-0.424***  -0.376***  -0.451***  0.223**  0.315***  0.350** 
  (0.118)  (0.110)  (0.120)  (0.103)  (0.118)  (0.138) 
Trend  0.045*  0.177***  0.032  -0.015  0.045**  0.038 
  (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.024) 
Constant  -84.490*  -365.456***  -61.847  35.264  -102.033**  -80.306 
  (48.700)  (69.346)  (58.450)  (31.213)  (48.394)  (50.984) 
Observations  2334  2334  2334  2334  2334  2334 
Hansen J-stat.  
(p-value) 
.184  .427  .351  .269  .535  .143 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 27 
 
 
Table 4: Non-OECD Countries Only (GDP Weights) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  LR  Practices  Laws 
       
Spatial Lag  0.364***  0.348***  0.105 
  (0.108)  (0.073)  (0.117) 
Lagged Dep. Var.  0.761***  0.617***  0.823*** 
  (0.043)  (0.061)  (0.037) 
Per capita GDP (log)  -0.035  0.167*  -0.115 
  (0.115)  (0.087)  (0.078) 
GDP (log)  -0.594***  -0.483***  -0.188*** 
  (0.100)  (0.086)  (0.055) 
GDP growth rate  -0.002  -0.002  0.002* 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Openness  -0.005**  -0.004**  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Industry Share in 
GDP 
0.029***  0.019**  0.010 
  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Labour Force 
Participation 
0.003  0.005  0.001 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Democracy   0.428***  0.123*  0.270*** 
  (0.103)  (0.069)  (0.067) 
Government Ideology  0.555***  0.331**  0.300*** 
  (0.194)  (0.150)  (0.098) 
IMF SAF 
participation 
0.345  0.075  0.253 
  (0.348)  (0.244)  (0.241) 
ILO 87 and 98 
Treaties 
-0.037  -0.462***  0.190* 
  (0.145)  (0.122)  (0.103) 
Trend  0.086*  0.050*  -0.012 
  (0.048)  (0.027)  (0.014) 
Constant  -167.176*  -93.779*  28.060 
  (97.703)  (54.125)  (30.919) 
Observations  2201  2201  2201 
Hansen J-stat.  (p-
value) 
 .559  .290  .401 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 




Table 5: Above and Below Median Labour Rights 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Below the Median Countries  Above the Median Countries 
  LR  Practices  Laws  LR  Practices  Laws 
             
Spatial Lag  0.453***  0.471***  0.201  0.064  0.098*  -0.014 
  (0.138)  (0.105)  (0.150)  (0.053)  (0.057)  (0.039) 
Lagged Dep. 
Var. 
0.652***  0.543***  0.700***  0.519***  0.368***  0.532*** 
  (0.057)  (0.071)  (0.051)  (0.074)  (0.070)  (0.073) 
Per capita 
GDP (log) 
-0.390**  0.127  -0.431**  0.038  0.068  -0.013 
  (0.163)  (0.157)  (0.172)  (0.145)  (0.104)  (0.085) 
GDP (log)  -0.419***  -0.445***  -0.025  -0.408***  -0.242***  -0.212*** 
  (0.112)  (0.102)  (0.093)  (0.115)  (0.079)  (0.067) 
GDP growth 
rate 
-0.015  -0.023  0.012  -0.000  -0.001  0.001* 
  (0.041)  (0.034)  (0.017)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Openness  -0.006***  -0.004***  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Ind. Share in 
GDP 
0.046***  0.028**  0.018  0.008  0.003  0.004 




-0.020  -0.015  -0.005  -0.013  -0.003  -0.009 
  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Democracy   0.634***  0.066  0.485***  0.239**  0.126*  0.151** 
  (0.156)  (0.123)  (0.108)  (0.102)  (0.065)  (0.071) 
Government 
Ideology 
0.738***  0.470**  0.344**  0.060  -0.031  0.094 
  (0.270)  (0.224)  (0.142)  (0.185)  (0.135)  (0.120) 
IMF SAF 
participation 
0.540  0.371  0.089  0.125  -0.206  0.380* 
  (0.545)  (0.370)  (0.355)  (0.308)  (0.265)  (0.219) 
ILO 87 and 
98 Treaties 
-0.240  -0.837***  0.388**  -0.087  -0.235**  0.065 
  (0.221)  (0.204)  (0.185)  (0.180)  (0.115)  (0.116) 
Trend  0.074  0.066*  -0.028  -0.117***  -0.092***  -0.061*** 
  (0.062)  (0.040)  (0.019)  (0.036)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
Constant  -138.804  -127.232  62.961  250.587***  198.557***  136.395*** 
  (127.972)  (81.578)  (38.472)  (73.416)  (40.433)  (39.056) 




1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 29 
 
 
Table 6: Above and Below the Median with Cross-Group Lags 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Below the Median Countries  Above the Median Countries 
  LR  Practices  Laws  LR  Practices  Laws 
Spatial Lag 
Below Med. 
0.419***  0.370***  0.118  0.223***  0.223***  -0.023 
  (0.141)  (0.133)  (0.159)  (0.086)  (0.073)  (0.066) 
Spatial Lag 
Above Med. 
0.057  0.127  -0.089  0.067  0.041  -0.017 
  (0.063)  (0.081)  (0.086)  (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.040) 
Lagged Dep. 
Var. 
0.700***  0.616***  0.732***  0.545***  0.400***  0.527*** 
  (0.051)  (0.058)  (0.051)  (0.063)  (0.068)  (0.069) 
Per capita 
GDP (log) 
-0.392***  0.078  -0.410**  0.028  0.062  -0.013 
  (0.152)  (0.136)  (0.161)  (0.138)  (0.100)  (0.084) 
GDP (log)  -0.389***  -0.397***  -0.025  -0.398***  -0.230***  -0.218*** 
  (0.102)  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.105)  (0.075)  (0.065) 
GDP growth   -0.019  -0.025  0.007  -0.001  -0.001  0.001* 
  (0.040)  (0.035)  (0.017)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Openness  -0.006***  -0.004***  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Industry 
Share in GDP 
0.047***  0.029**  0.019*  0.011  0.004  0.005 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
Labour Force 
Participation 
-0.018  -0.013  -0.004  -0.013  -0.003  -0.009 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Democracy   0.616***  0.088  0.455***  0.241**  0.123**  0.156** 
  (0.147)  (0.113)  (0.103)  (0.100)  (0.062)  (0.070) 
Government 
Ideology 
0.741***  0.404*  0.351**  0.068  -0.026  0.096 
  (0.259)  (0.211)  (0.138)  (0.185)  (0.131)  (0.120) 
IMF SAF 
participation 
0.403  0.244  0.048  0.171  -0.207  0.413* 
  (0.550)  (0.377)  (0.355)  (0.307)  (0.268)  (0.217) 
ILO 87 and 
98 Treaties 
-0.256  -0.743***  0.343**  -0.106  -0.224**  0.067 
  (0.206)  (0.186)  (0.173)  (0.175)  (0.110)  (0.114) 
Trend  0.112  0.085**  -0.054  -0.015  -0.031  -0.063*** 
  (0.077)  (0.041)  (0.034)  (0.058)  (0.026)  (0.020) 
Constant  -218.474  -167.251**  117.198*  41.414  72.838  141.775*** 
  (158.493)  (83.569)  (70.348)  (118.773)  (53.203)  (42.640) 
Observations  1187  1187  1187  1147  1147  1147 
Hansen J-stat.  
(p-value) 
1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 30 
 
Table 7: Above and Below Median Average Income Countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Below the Median Countries  Above the Median Countries 
  LR  Practices  Laws  LR  Practices  Laws 
             
Spatial Lag  0.075  0.227***  -0.065  0.393***  0.431***  0.106 
  (0.096)  (0.087)  (0.070)  (0.111)  (0.085)  (0.181) 
Lagged Dep. 
Var. 
0.751***  0.682***  0.751***  0.667***  0.491***  0.780*** 
  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.071)  (0.067) 
Per capita 
GDP (log) 
-0.423  -0.466**  -0.007  0.358  0.813***  -0.156 
  (0.298)  (0.221)  (0.201)  (0.234)  (0.274)  (0.159) 
GDP (log)  -0.625***  -0.411***  -0.262***  -0.690***  -0.620***  -0.180** 
  (0.122)  (0.065)  (0.088)  (0.124)  (0.113)  (0.077) 
GDP growth 
rate 
0.000  -0.001  0.001  -0.043  -0.049  0.005 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.045)  (0.035)  (0.012) 
Openness  -0.007***  -0.006***  -0.000  0.001  0.002  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Industry 
Share in GDP 
0.042***  0.017*  0.024**  0.034**  0.044***  0.003 
  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Labour Force 
Participation  
0.008  -0.003  0.015  -0.023**  -0.020*  -0.006 
  (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
Democracy   0.462***  0.211**  0.260***  0.611***  0.161*  0.353*** 
  (0.131)  (0.093)  (0.096)  (0.145)  (0.097)  (0.102) 
Government 
Ideology 
0.911***  0.450***  0.468**  0.366  0.195  0.224** 
  (0.278)  (0.169)  (0.184)  (0.225)  (0.178)  (0.112) 
IMF SAF 
participation 
0.726*  0.076  0.527**  -0.367  -0.206  -0.321 
  (0.380)  (0.322)  (0.251)  (0.537)  (0.354)  (0.363) 
ILO 87 and 
98 Treaties 
0.033  -0.296**  0.272  0.309  -0.194  0.284* 
  (0.227)  (0.149)  (0.178)  (0.237)  (0.166)  (0.171) 
Trend  -0.033  0.042  -0.021  0.051  0.030  -0.027 
  (0.051)  (0.040)  (0.015)  (0.047)  (0.028)  (0.035) 
Constant  78.983  -73.251  49.647  -96.509  -58.299  60.322 
  (103.128)  (80.225)  (30.970)  (96.120)  (56.770)  (74.207) 
Observations  1157  1157  1157  1177  1177  1177 
Hansen J-stat.  
(p-value) 
1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 31 
 
 
Table 8: Above and Below Median Average Income Countries with Cross-Group Lags 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Low Income Countries  High Income Countries 
  LR  Practices  Laws  LR  Practices  Laws 
Spatial Lag 
Below Med. 
0.086  0.220**  -0.083  -0.088  0.013  0.020 
  (0.102)  (0.094)  (0.072)  (0.096)  (0.083)  (0.092) 
Spatial Lag 
Above Med. 
0.241**  0.074  0.148  0.378***  0.428***  0.081 
  (0.112)  (0.073)  (0.178)  (0.113)  (0.087)  (0.182) 
Lagged Dep. 
Var. 
0.758***  0.666***  0.750***  0.687***  0.504***  0.788*** 
  (0.043)  (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.052)  (0.060)  (0.060) 
Per capita 
GDP (log) 
-0.416  -0.476**  -0.023  0.330  0.793***  -0.152 
  (0.298)  (0.229)  (0.199)  (0.224)  (0.261)  (0.154) 
GDP (log)  -0.619***  -0.426***  -0.267***  -0.655***  -0.610***  -0.175** 
  (0.119)  (0.066)  (0.093)  (0.115)  (0.103)  (0.071) 
GDP growth  -0.000  -0.001  0.001  -0.047  -0.048  0.003 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.043)  (0.035)  (0.012) 
Openness  -0.007***  -0.006***  -0.001  0.001  0.002  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Industry Share 
in GDP 
0.042***  0.017  0.025**  0.034**  0.044***  0.004 
  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Labour Force 
Participation 
0.007  -0.003  0.014  -0.022*  -0.019*  -0.005 
  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
Democracy   0.456***  0.211**  0.271***  0.589***  0.162*  0.350*** 
  (0.130)  (0.094)  (0.102)  (0.142)  (0.094)  (0.096) 
Government 
Ideology 
0.912***  0.466***  0.487***  0.360*  0.199  0.230** 
  (0.271)  (0.169)  (0.184)  (0.214)  (0.174)  (0.109) 
IMF SAF 
participation 
0.728*  0.102  0.507**  -0.433  -0.215  -0.315 
  (0.378)  (0.321)  (0.246)  (0.538)  (0.360)  (0.366) 
ILO 87 and 98 
Treaties 
0.037  -0.306**  0.269  0.282  -0.201  0.269 
  (0.224)  (0.152)  (0.173)  (0.230)  (0.164)  (0.166) 
Trend  0.084  0.055  0.008  0.013  0.039  -0.030 
  (0.082)  (0.045)  (0.038)  (0.069)  (0.042)  (0.037) 
Constant  -159.714  -101.301  -10.483  -19.712  -74.744  67.295 
  (167.388)  (91.337)  (78.851)  (141.093)  (86.142)  (77.854) 
Observations  1157  1157  1157  1177  1177  1177 
Hansen J-stat.  
(p-value) 
1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Notes: All specifications include country-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 32 
 
 
Table 9: Regional Results 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  ASIA  SUBSAHARA  EUROPE  AMERICAS  MIDEAST 
 
Labour Rights 
Spatial Lag  -0.270*  0.006  0.031  0.247***  -0.022 
  (0.160)  (0.094)  (0.074)  (0.069)  (0.173) 
Labour Practices 
Spatial Lag  -0.220*  -0.010  0.070  0.200***  0.463*** 
  (0.123)  (0.080)  (0.058)  (0.063)  (0.141) 
Labour Laws 
Spatial Lag  -0.208**  0.128  0.059  0.172  -0.002 
  (0.094)  (0.152)  (0.050)  (0.187)  (0.132) 
           
Observations  374  776  253  493  306 
Notes: All specifications include all of the additional controls including country-specific fixed 
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Appendix 1: Countries under Study 
 
Albania  Colombia  Haiti  Mexico  Slovenia 
Algeria  Comoros  Honduras  Moldova  South Africa 
Angola  Congo Dem. Rep.  Hungary  Mongolia  Sri Lanka 
Antigua and Barbuda  Congo Republic  India  Morocco  St. Lucia 
Argentina  Costa Rica  Indonesia  Mozambique  Sudan 
Armenia  Cote d'Ivoire  Iran  Myanmar  Suriname 
Azerbaijan  Croatia  Iraq  Namibia  Swaziland 
Bahamas  Cuba  Israel  Nepal  Syrian Arab Republic 
Bahrain  Cyprus  Jamaica  Nicaragua  Taiwan 
Bangladesh  Czech Republic  Jordan  Niger  Tajikistan 
Barbados  Djibouti  Kazakhstan  Nigeria  Tanzania 
Belarus  Dominica  Kenya  Oman  Thailand 
Belize  Dominican Republic  Korea Republic  Pakistan  Togo 
Benin  Ecuador  Kuwait  Panama  Tonga 
Bhutan  Egypt  Kyrgyz Republic  Papua New Guinea  Trinidad and Tobago 
Bolivia  El Salvador  Lao PDR  Paraguay  Tunisia 
Botswana  Equatorial Guinea  Latvia  Peru  Turkey 
Brazil  Eritrea  Lebanon  Philippines  Turkmenistan 
Brunei  Estonia  Lesotho  Poland  Uganda 
Bulgaria  Ethiopia  Liberia  Qatar  Ukraine 
Burkina Faso  Fiji  Libya  Romania  United Arab Emirates 
Burundi  Gabon  Lithuania  Russian Federation  Uruguay 
Cambodia  Gambia  Macedonia, FYR  Rwanda  Uzbekistan 
Cameroon  Georgia  Madagascar  Saudi Arabia  Vanuatu 
Cape Verde  Ghana  Malawi  Senegal  Venezuela 
Central Af. Rep.  Guatemala  Malaysia  Seychelles  Vietnam 
Chad  Guinea  Mali  Sierra Leone  Yemen Republic 
Chile  Guinea-Bissau  Mauritania  Singapore  Zambia 














Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Observations 
Aggregated Labour Rights   25.873  7.750  0.000  37.000  2458 
Labour Rights Practices  22.231  4.445  0.000  27.500  2610 
Labour Rights Laws  22.642  5.499  0.000  28.500  2610 
Per capita GDP (log)  7.122  1.366  2.856  10.995  2610 
GDP (log)  8.854  1.880  4.813  14.069  2461 
Growth Rate of GDP  1.848  27.811  -44.191  973.608  2610 
Openness  62.86  53.012  4.96  986.64  2334 
Industry Share in GDP  29.609  13.459  0.270  91.607  2468 
Labour Force Participation Rate  66.644  11.766  6.755  93.200  2610 
Democracy (Freedom House)  -4.228  1.795  -1.000  -7.000  2505 
Government's Ideology  0.105  0.694  -1.000  1.000  2473 
IMF SAP participation  0.115  0.319  0.000  1.000  2610 
ILO 87 and 98 Treaties Ratified  1.287  0.851  0.000  2.000  2610 
Spatial lag: Labour Rights  21.267  2.409  16.684  27.012  2461 
Spatial lag: Labour Rights 
Practices  19.565  1.808  16.073  22.807  2461 
Spatial lag: Labour Rights Laws  20.702  0.871  19.109  23.785  2461 
 
Appendix 3: Data Sources 
 
Variables  Data description  Data Sources 
Labour Rights index 
Measures 37 aspects of Labour rights (both Laws and 
Practices) on a scale of 0 – 74.5 (see section 3) 
Mosley and Uno (2007) 
 
Labour Rights Practices and 
Laws 
Measures 16 aspects of Labour rights Practices on a 
scale  of  0  –  27.5  and  21  aspects  of  Labour  rights 
Laws on a scale of 0 – 28.5 (see section 3)  Mosley and Uno (2007) 
Spatial lag: Labour rights 
Labour rights in k sample (not i
th country) weighted 
by GDP  Own construction 
Per capita GDP and growth rate 
Per capita GDP (logged) in US$ 2000 constant prices 
and rate of growth of per capita GDP. 
Economic Research Service (ERS), 
Washington DC 
Openness  (Exports + Imports)/GDP  UNCTAD 
Industry share in GDP  Share of industry value-added in total GDP  UNCTAD 
Labour Force Participation Rate  Total Labour Force share in Population  UNCTAD 
Democracy index 
 
Average of Civil and Political Liberties index coded 







Incumbent government’s ideology coded on a scale 
of -1 to +1 where -1 is right wing, 0 is centrists, and 
+1 is right wing in power. 
DPI (Database of Political Institutions 
dataset developed by Keefer 2001). 
IMF SAP 
 
Dummy  capturing  whether  a  country  was  under 
IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program or not  Dreher (2006) 
ILO 87 and 98 conventions 
ratified 
Dummy  capturing  whether  a  country  ratified  ILO 
conventions on labour rights, 87 and 98 or not 
ILO database on conventions 
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